As Donald Trump returns to discuss the NATO issue during an interview with NBC, reiterating that his new administration will consider withdrawing from NATO if allies “do not pay their bill”, it is clear that the US approach to Europe and the enlarged Mediterranean after January 20th remains substantially unchanged. While the sincerity of such statements is questionable, the underlying goal is clear: to extract additional military spending commitments from European allies. This approach, already successfully tested by the first Trump administration, aims to ensure that allies contribute more to their defence. However, it’s undeniable that a – second – Trump administration would adopt a more assertive and confrontational approach to NATO’s allies than Biden.
What’s the news, then? Neither Europe nor the Southern Flank (or the “Enlarged Mediterranean”, as the Italians call it) currently holds significant strategic weight in the eyes of the United States. The Americans are deeply engaged in a competition with China for global primacy and are convinced that the potential battlefield of this competition is the Indo-Pacific.
This doesn’t mean that Europe is useless. It provides legitimacy for the United States due to the quality and quantity of its NATO members. Moreover, it allows the projection of the US military power and has cutting-edge armed forces that could make a difference in a conflict.
Similarly, the Enlarged Mediterranean is crucial to the current great power competition. The crisis over access to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal is proof of this. Proper or improper handling of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict can legitimize or delegitimize a major power. Finally, great power competition is not limited to the Indo-Pacific but is ready to openly break out in other regions, such as the Enlarged Mediterranean, as has already happened.
The United States is well aware of the importance of this region and maintains 25 military bases and 40,000 troops deployed. Therefore, the willingness to disengage should not be confused with the desire to implement a unilateral withdrawal. Instead, it indicates a growing attempt – even more pronounced under Trump – to shift the burden of regional security to its more powerful allies and partners, including Israel, Saudi Arabia, and European countries.
The final communiqué of the 2024 Washington Summit suggested that NATO could and should play a more decisive role in the region, making the 360-degree approach a reality. However, despite the long series of crises affecting the southern flank, this remains a subordinate theater in NATO strategy for two main reasons. Firstly, the threats from the Mediterranean area do not immediately threaten the territorial integrity of Atlantic Alliance members. Second, the southern flank’s vastness, encompassing the Middle East, North Africa, the Sahel, and Sub-Saharan Africa, presents challenges in identifying a single adversary and, as a consequence, a coherent strategy.
At the beginning of the century, the United States advanced the “global war on terror” as a framework for NATO’s role in the post-Cold War system. After an initial consensus following the 9/11 attacks, many European allies rejected it.
Today, Italy and other countries interested in preserving both NATO and its security commitments must consolidate a new framework for addressing the South: countering revisionist powers’ malicious policies. Paraphrasing the first NATO Secretary-General, Lord Ismay, this would be the best way to “keep the US in the Enlarged Mediterranean and Russia out of the region”.
Indeed, the eastern and southern flank cannot be managed separately. Putin’s moves on the global chessboard dramatically confirm this. Russia’s growing influence in this region is part of a broader revisionist strategy, along with the aggression against Ukraine, launched against the post-Cold War international order and partially agreed upon with China.
Therefore, European allies should certainly do more in terms of both burden-sharing and risk-sharing. However, they should spend more and risk more to counter threats coming from the southern flank.
How can NATO concretely turn its promise of a 360-degree approach into reality?
On one side, it must enhance partnerships with like-minded countries. Including Southern Flank countries in annual NATO Summits could facilitate their deeper integration with the Alliance’s values, interests, and objectives and bolster NATO’s legitimacy within these countries. Furthermore, should empower the Special Representative, revitalize cooperation with Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative countries, and formalize ties with influential organizations such as the African Union and ECOWAS.
On the other side, it must prevent the weaponization of fragile states against its member territories by Russia, China, and terrorist and criminal organizations. To this end, NATO should extend “Defense and Related Security Capacity Building (DCB) programs” to all nations requesting assistance to enhance partners’ defense and security capabilities. Given the extreme sensitivity of the maritime dimension, NATO should also enable these countries to consolidate their sovereignty in protecting maritime routes and infrastructure.
