Russia is witnessing the gradual erosion of its influence over its historical allies. In an increasingly bipolar international system, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) has proven incapable of positioning itself as an alternative to NATO. The Organization’s charter proclaims “protection of independence on a collective basis, territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Member States” (Article 3). Yet, during real crises the alliance has shown little cohesion and an inability to protect its members’ interests. The CSTO now finds itself on the fringes of the geopolitical chessboard, as Russia continues to lose influence in the region.
HISTORY OF THE COLLECTIVE SECURITY TREATY ORGANIZATION
Following the dissolution of the USSR, the Russian Federation’s leadership promoted the creation of a shared military apparatus in the post-Soviet territories. Two main factors drove the establishment of the Organization: the need for stability among individual states and Moscow’s desire to retain its hegemonic power in the region. These motivations led to the Tashkent Treaty in 1992, a preliminary collective security agreement signed by Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Uzbekistan. The following year, Belarus, Azerbaijan, and Georgia joined. The first signs of fragmentation appeared only a few years later. In 1999, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Uzbekistan withdrew from the alliance, distancing themselves from Russian influence.
In 2002, the Organization formalised its current structure, which includes a security council, legislative assembly, various committees, and a shared military apparatus. Similar to NATO’s Article 5, the CSTO’s Article 4 establishes the principle of collective defence, stating that an attack on one member is considered an attack on the entire alliance. Despite its defensive military framework, the CSTO has displayed structural inefficiencies and a lack of cooperation, casting doubt on its effectiveness.
AN INEFFECTIVE ALLIANCE
Kyrgyzstan, 2010
A prominent example of CSTO’s ineffectiveness was its lack of response to ethnic clashes in southern Kyrgyzstan in June 2010. The crisis resulted in hundreds of deaths and a wave of displaced people, prompting the Kyrgyz government to request CSTO intervention. However, the Organization refused to act, citing that the Kyrgyz crisis was an internal issue.
The CSTO’s reluctance to intervene, even for peacekeeping, raised doubts about the alliance’s utility and cohesion. This passive approach stems from political and strategic considerations. Russia has repeatedly shown a calculated, pragmatic approach, prioritising its national and geopolitical interests over those of the alliance. The Kyrgyzstan episode highlighted Moscow’s unwillingness to commit militarily to regional crises that do not directly threaten its security or hegemonic role.
Nagorno-Karabakh, 2020
Criticism of Moscow’s leadership in the CSTO intensified in Armenia, a historical Russian ally, which hosts Russia’s 102nd military base, with over 3,000 soldiers.
Tensions rose during the 2020 escalation in Nagorno-Karabakh, when Azerbaijani forces entered the disputed region, claiming sovereignty. Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan invoked Article 4 of the CSTO Charter, requesting the Organization’s intervention. However, the CSTO chose not to act, with then-Secretary General Stanislav Zas downplaying the events as a border incident that did not warrant intervention. Moscow justified its inaction by stating that Nagorno-Karabakh is not officially recognized as part of Armenia’s internationally acknowledged territory, therefore negating an automatic obligation to intervene.
This lack of support provoked a strong reaction in Armenia, leading the government to reassess its historical ties with Russia and explore relations with the West. Prime Minister Pashinyan openly expressed dissatisfaction and even threatened Armenia’s withdrawal from the CSTO. The case revealed how the CSTO remains largely shaped by Russia’s priorities, with Moscow favouring neutrality to preserve relations with Azerbaijan, a key economic partner in the region.
RUSSIA’S CONTROL OVER THE CSTO
For Russia, the CSTO serves as a tool to consolidate its regional supremacy and maintain control over strategic areas of interest. Rather than acting as a multilateral security alliance in the traditional sense, the CSTO operates as an extension of Kremlin influence, allowing Moscow to exert significant control over its member states. This dominance enables Russia to shape the organization’s agenda and actions per its geopolitical priorities.
Moscow’s influence is particularly evident in leadership appointments. Since the CSTO’s establishment in 2002, Russian generals have overwhelmingly dominated key positions. While non-Russian officers have led the General Staff for only nine years, Moscow has retained the role of Secretary General for 16 years. This control over leadership underscores Russia’s strategic intent to maintain a firm hold on the organization’s direction and decision-making processes.
The CSTO’s operations and responses to regional crises further reflect Russia’s priorities. For instance, during the January 2022 unrest in Kazakhstan, the CSTO deployed forces to stabilize the situation. While officially framed as a peacekeeping mission, the intervention was widely interpreted as a move to protect Russia’s geopolitical and economic interests in Central Asia’s largest economy. Such actions reveal how the CSTO operates less as a collective defence pact and more as an instrument of Russian foreign policy.
This imbalance in power dynamics has implications for the CSTO’s cohesion and effectiveness. The organization’s heavy reliance on Moscow undermines its ability to function as a true multilateral alliance, fostering resentment among member states and limiting its appeal as a balanced and equitable security framework. As a result, the CSTO often finds itself constrained by Russia’s overarching influence, which prioritizes its own strategic goals above collective interests.
Western countries have consistently avoided formal cooperation with the CSTO, condemning Russia’s supremacy within the alliance. While there are shared interests in areas like counterterrorism and regional stability, NATO remains cautious about engaging with the CSTO, fearing that doing so could inadvertently validate Russia’s dominance within the bloc and its broader aspirations to counterbalance Western influence.
WHAT CAN WE EXPECT FOR THE FUTURE?
The future of the CSTO remains uncertain. Continuous failures, disregard for alliance principles, and internal divisions continue to weaken the Organization, with the Kremlin far from securing hegemony in the post-Soviet space.
Despite Russia’s de facto control over the CSTO, its partners have often distanced themselves from Moscow in foreign policy matters. None of the member states have recognized the separatist republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine further deepened internal divisions. No CSTO members have formally recognized the independence of Donetsk and Luhansk, nor was there any intention to send contingents to support Russia’s offensive. This hesitation underscores the members’ reluctance to fully align with Moscow’s aggressive policies in its near abroad.
Central Asian member states have maintained a pragmatic approach to foreign relations, balancing their ties with Moscow against growing economic and diplomatic engagement with Western nations and regional powers like China and Turkey. For instance, Kazakhstan, a key CSTO member, openly expressed its commitment to Ukraine’s territorial integrity and repeatedly called for a peaceful resolution to the conflict. Furthermore, Kazakhstan refused to allow its territory to be used for circumventing Western sanctions imposed on Russia.
China has emerged as the main beneficiary of Russia’s waning influence in the region, deepening trade ties with Central Asian states. Through the Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing has consolidated its economic presence in the region, filling the gaps left by Russia. CSTO member states are diversifying their diplomatic and economic partnerships, reducing dependence on Moscow. China’s role in Central Asia is increasingly dominant, including in security, as it positions itself as a guarantor of regional stability.
NATO does not perceive the CSTO as a threat, and the differences between the two alliances are stark, particularly in terms of member cooperation and operational effectiveness. In the post-Cold War era, NATO conducted over 30 large-scale operations (such as Kosovo and Afghanistan). By contrast, the CSTO has undertaken only one intervention –a week-long operation in Kazakhstan– which also provoked dissent among members. While the Organization is presented as a counterweight to NATO’s influence in Eurasia, it lacks the political cohesion, operational capacity, and collective will to respond to crises effectively.
