Numerous actors on the southern side of the Luzon Strait are growing increasingly uncomfortable with the idea of the Philippines being involved in a potential Taiwan contingency. However, protecting the strait from both sides appears to be a priority for the United States. In this context, Washington seems to be pursuing an underlying strategic bargain with the Philippines, consistently seeking to integrate and potentially entrap Manila into Taiwan security through a series of initiatives. However, in recent times Manila and Taipei seem to have autonomously -and quietly- expanded security cooperation. This article will briefly analyze recent developments in Philippine-Taiwan security, from the angle of US statecraft, from the angle of expanded cooperative security efforts and finally, from the Philippines’ perspective.
First and foremost, in the announcement of the expansion of EDCA sites in the Philippines in 2023, several of these sites are located facing the Luzon Strait. In fact, three new EDCA sites were established in northern Luzon: the Naval Base Camilo Osias in Santa Ana, Cagayan, the Lal-lo Airport in Lal-lo, Cagayan, and Camp Melchor Dela Cruz in Gamu, Isabela. The opening of these sites raised concerns in Manila, as they do not appear to directly bolster security in areas considered of “existential” importance to the Philippines—namely, features such as the Spratly Islands and Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea. Moreover, the expansion of EDCA appears to have been a move driven by strategic statecraft aimed at securing the strait, negotiated primarily with the central government. Accounts have also shown how the establishment of EDCA sites, especially in Cagayan, has encountered opposition from local governments, which fear compromising the steady flow of Chinese investments into the area. Lastly, the deployment of the Typhon missile systemby the US in Luzon is a strategic move to bolster deterrence in the whole “first island chain”, including Taiwan.
Second, the annual Balikatan exercises—which have seen a progressive increase in the number of participating troops, countries, and geographic scope—also appear to be oriented toward both the South China Sea and the Luzon Strait. Once again, the emphasis placed by the Philippines on Balikatan focuses on how such exercises strengthen defense ties with the United States and with like-minded partners that have concluded Visiting Forces Agreements or Reciprocal Access Agreements, such as Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and potentially France. However, allowing foreign military forces to conduct exercises in the Luzon Strait also provides these actors with a privileged opportunity to observe the geography and terrain surrounding the strait. In the series of interactions that led the Philippines, the United States, and Japan to form a trilateral security grouping (also known as JAPHUS), as well as the subsequent SQUAD grouping with Australia, Taiwan security remains a lingering—yet largely unspoken—issue that has, among other factors, driven these “San Francisco system” allies to strengthen maritime security in the seas surrounding the Philippines. Crucially in late February 2026 the Philippines, the US and the Japanese navies conducted a Multilateral Maritime Cooperative Activity (MMCA) around the island of Mavulis in the Bashi channel.
Third, while it may appear that the Philippines is serving as premium “real estate” for foreign powers seeking to establish a strategic foothold near Taiwan, one could argue that Manila also has its own underlying interests in strengthening security and military presence around the Strait. One key factor is the large number of Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs) in Taiwan. In fact, more than 200,000 Filipino migrant workers are currently employed there, sometimes “weaponized” by Beijing in the attempt to dissuade a greater Filipino involvement in Taiwan-related security initiatives, creating a strong foreign policy incentive for Manila to justify an increased presence in the area. This situation is somewhat anomalous in the broader relationship between Taiwan and Southeast Asia, insofar as Manila must consider such contingencies as having a direct impact on its national interests. Furthermore, the Philippines’ geographic location makes it particularly vulnerable to conflict spillovers, including potential refugee inflows and even the risk of being directly targeted. In other words, Taiwan’s status as an indispensable economic partner for Manila—often overlooked due to the polarization of Philippine foreign policy discourse around the United States and China—and as a source of indirect security risks requires the Philippines to pay particular attention to the island.
However, as a relatively weaker state with limited capabilities, Manila faces a significant dilemma in relation to Taiwan security. On the one hand, the Philippines has become increasingly embedded in a broader “latticework” of alignments and strategic partnerships aimed at strengthening the first island chain, within which Philippine and Taiwanese security are framed as closely interconnected. This orientation has the advantage of acknowledging the spillover effects of potential contingencies and has, so far, resulted in relatively prudent and defensive forms of security cooperation—partly due to the cautious approach of partners such as Japan and Australia, insomuch that Manila seems to have understood how a Taiwan contingency could be a major concern for its own security. On the other hand, the risk of entrapment in a Taiwan-related conflict is particularly salient for a weaker state like the Philippines, which is already grappling with its own pressing security challenges, including Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea and persistent internal security threats.
Beyond these “classic” dilemmas, patterns of U.S. military adventurism may further heighten Manila’s concerns about entrapment, especially in the event of a Taiwan crisis. While the Philippines–U.S. alliance appears to have remained resilient despite changes in U.S. administrations—from Biden to Trump—this continuity primarily helps mitigate Manila’s fears of abandonment in relation to South China Sea defense commitments. However, it does not fully shield the Philippines from the possibility of unilateral U.S. military actions, particularly if such actions are undertaken rapidly and with limited coordination with allies. While such scenarios may be more likely in contexts that do not involve a major power like China, the unpredictability associated with more populist foreign policy approaches remains a concern for weaker allies.
Finally, the Philippines’ role in Taiwan security may also be shaped by Taiwanese agency. Strengthening communication channels between the Philippines and Taiwan could be crucial for managing Manila’s involvement in Bashi Channel security, while also helping to build confidence regarding the Philippine role in specific contingencies. In practice, albeit informally, the Philippines and Taiwan have already begun to expand their security engagement through various bilateral interactions, aimed at achieving better naval and security coordination. This development underscores how, despite great power influence and orchestration, actors within the Indo-Pacific “first island chain” retain agency in shaping and coordinating their own security trajectories, in what has been defined as a “deliberate effort” to tackle security issues autonomously and bilaterally. While there is still considerable room to deepen such cooperation, the foundations are already in place and may generate broader strategic effects in the regional security landscape.
