James Lee is Assistant Research Professor at the Institute of European and American Studies at Academia Sinica in Taiwan. His research interests include the historical and legal aspects of U.S. foreign policy and the security of Taiwan. He has published his academic research in several journals including the International Studies Quarterly, Business and Politics, and the Journal of Strategic Studies.
In your view, is it likely that U.S. policy toward Taiwan and the broader Indo-Pacific region will undergo significant changes following the election of Donald J. Trump?
I don’t think there’s clear evidence to date that U.S. policy toward Taiwan will change significantly in Trump’s second term. I think the United States will keep its policy of strategic ambiguity, both for the strategic reasons that have often been raised (e.g., dual deterrence) and because Trump likes to be unpredictable. It’s hard to say what specifically the new administration will do with respect to the Quad and AUKUS, but I think it’s safe to say that the United States will place more emphasis on burden-sharing (n.b. Kurt Campbell has said AUKUS submarines could be deployed in a Taiwan contingency). On Japan, I don’t think there’s been evidence so far that suggests that the United States will reconsider its decision to upgrade U.S. Forces Japan to a Joint Forces Command. Overall, the U.S. will focus on burden-sharing and preventing the outbreak of another conflict, especially on the Korean Peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait. I think the U.S. will also be an important factor in other countries’ decisions about supporting Taiwan’s defense. Responding to U.S. requests, India has reportedly drafted plans for how it would respond to a Taiwan contingency.
What assessment is it possible to make regarding Taiwan’s defense?
On Taiwan’s defense, I think the United States will continue to be critical for Taipei’s attempts to deter Beijing, but I think there will be greater pressure on Taiwan to implement an asymmetric defense strategy and perhaps civil defense. Wellington Koo, Taiwan’s defense minister, has said that a Chinese blockade of Taiwan would be considered an “act of aggression” that would trigger a Taiwanese military response, and this may be a sign of greater clarity in the future about Taiwan’s response in potential cross-strait scenarios.
How can the phenomenon of Taiwan’s diminishing diplomatic recognition be analyzed, and how will the US act in this context?
I think the US will continue to be important for Taiwan’s efforts to maintain its diplomatic space. Fulfilling the TAIPEI Act, the United States has been proactive about countering Beijing’s attempts to constrain Taiwan’s diplomatic space, especially as those attempts involve distortions of UNGA 2758. Laura Rosenberger, the Chairperson of AIT, clarified that UNGA 2758 did not determine the status of Taiwan. The United States pushed back against South Africa’s ultimatum to Taiwan to move its representative office out of the capital in Pretoria, and since Taiwan officially rejected the ultimatum and the “deadline” of October 30 passed without Taiwan taking the action that South Africa demanded, I think it’s safe to say that the ultimatum has been dropped. This incident shows how important U.S. support is for Taiwan’s efforts to maintain its diplomatic space.
What policy instruments might the Trump administration field to contain People’s Republic of China technological advancement, and how should the recent military exercises conducted by the People’s Liberation Army around Taiwan be interpreted?
I think there will be greater scrutiny on Taiwan’s compliance with U.S. export control policies, especially since TSMC’s chips were recently discovered in Huawei’s technology. Regarding military aspects, I believe geoeconomics will be a key tool for the U.S. to slow the PLA’s defense modernization insofar as it restricts China’s access to dual-use technology. I don’t have my own assessment of the PLA’s joint capabilities, but I think Beijing is using its exercises in the Taiwan Strait as a way of testing its capabilities. Even though Beijing describes these exercises as a political message to Taiwan, I think its real motive is its defense modernization. Generally speaking, I think that Beijing is using the scenario of a Taiwan contingency as an operational benchmark for assessing the PLA’s progress toward its 2049 goal of challenging the United States on a global scale; I don’t think Beijing actually intends to use force in 2027, as some people have argued.
