From the diplomatic fallout of recent U.S. strikes in Iran to the strategic shifts unveiled at the Ninth Party Congress, 38 North author and Stimson Center Senior Fellow Rachel Minyoung Lee analyzes North Korea’s increasingly assertive stance. As Pyongyang pushes for formal recognition as a nuclear power, Lee assesses whether Kim Ju-ae’s high-profile public appearances signal a genuine succession plan or serve primarily as a sophisticated propaganda tool.
- One of the first questions concerns your article of March 3rd on 38 North, among the earliest analyses of North Korea’s intensified anti-American rhetoric following US strikes against Iran. Building on that: how did the regime communicate these events domestically? Through which channels did this narrative unfold, and what elements were emphasised the most?
As you know, communication in North Korea operates along two main tracks. On one side, there is official state media, which provides the only fully accessible layer and forms the basis of most external analysis, including mine. On the other hand, there are internal channels, such as educational materials, workplace sessions, domestic-only radio broadcasts and so on, to which outside observers have no direct access. Insight into these internal dynamics depends on sources such as Daily NK, which in turn rely on contacts inside the country. Until such reporting emerges, in terms of how the North Korean people may be receiving information about the Iran situation, and how they may be educated on that through private channels, the internal reception of events like that remains largely unknown.
The Foreign Ministry pronouncement, another official channel we have access to, of March 1st represented a relatively rapid response, consistent with North Korea’s typical one-to two-day reaction window to major international developments. The chosen format, a spokesperson’s press statement, sits at a mid-level within the hierarchy of official communications. Notably, the anti-US rhetoric was stronger than in previous comparable episodes, including the June 2025 strikes on Iranian nuclear sites and the January raid in Venezuela, indicating a degree of escalation. It should be noted, though, that the DPRK is still refraining from personally attacking Trump, or calling the US by the administration’s name. And that is in line with what we have been seeing over the past year and more: while the regime criticises the United States, it refrains from criticizing the Trump administration. So those two things should be distinguished. And that does appear to be in line with my analysis, and the analysis of many people, that the Kim Jong-un regime is trying to maintain flexibility, in case there is room for re-engagement.
Going back to the escalation in anti-US rhetoric in the Foreign Ministry pronouncement, I think we should see that in the broader context of what we saw in the Ninth Party Congress readout from the North Korean media. That document is slightly hard to analyse because the regime did not provide the full text of Kim Jong-un’s speech, so we really have to read between the lines. They picked and chose what they wanted to share with us, so it is really easy to get sucked into certain words that have been used. If you read the entire section on the US in the Ninth Party Congress readout, it was not a pretty picture the regime painted of the US: a disruptor of peace, a country that cannot be trusted, one that betrays even its allies. So, I think that deep mistrust of the United States is there, and what is happening around the world since the Trump administration took office, including what’s going on in Iran right now, is only reinforcing that sense of mistrust toward the United States in the Kim regime’s mind.
There’s been a lot of emphasis on that one sentence in the party congress report that said that there’s no reason why North Korea can’t get along with the United States, if Washington recognizes their constitutional status and drops its hostile policy toward Pyongyang. That sentence really should be compared against what Kim Jong-un said at the Supreme People’s Assembly in September 2025. He said something very similar at the time, but not the same: “there is no reason why we can’t stand face to face, if the US drops its denuclearization demand.” Compare that to: “There’s no reason why we can’t get along with the United States if it recognizes our new constitutional status and drops its hostile policy.” The difference is that “stand face to face” is evocative of dialogue, it’s more specific; but “get along” is a whole spectrum, ranging from not fighting, not being in a conflict, to normalizing relations. So, this notion is less specific than September 2025, in my opinion.
Mind also the conditions requested. In September, Kim Jong-un said “I can meet you if you don’t talk about denuclearization;” this time he said, “you have to recognize our constitutional status,” which is a reference to their nuclear status. There’s a difference between “dropping the denuclearization demand” and “recognizing their nuclear status.” One surely could argue those are one and the same, but recognizing nuclear status is, in my mind, stronger: it’s more specific. And the DPRK added a new condition: withdrawal of hostile policy. And, of course, “hostile policy” is a very vague term, it can mean anything the regime wants.
In my opinion, the DPRK reassessed its position on a number of things, between September and late February, when they held the Ninth Party Congress, and something made them harden their position, even though they continue to refrain from criticizing Trump. And I think the answer is in the party congress readout. The tone is very triumphant, the way the regime describes itself, you know, the achievements they’ve made. Even though Kim Jong-un does talk about existing problems, is how they perceive themselves on the global stage that’s relevant. There was this one sentence where the party congress report referred to building a just, fair international order: “we are in the centre of that movement.” That tells you a great deal about how they perceive themselves. Based on that, if you were Kim Jong-un, why would you lower your demands to meet with Trump?
Taking that assessment and then looking at the initial North Korean Foreign Ministry pronouncement on the Venezuela situation, you can see why the anti-US rhetoric in that pronouncement was stronger compared to June 2025 and January 2026. It’s important here to look at words and facts within a broader context and check them with the trends. The regime doesn’t say things in a vacuum, there’s a reason for why they say what they say. And if you see stronger rhetoric, you’ve got to think about that within the bigger trend.
Just one more thing to add regarding North Korea’s position on Iran. I have seen media reports about the second Foreign Ministry pronouncement, in the role of the Ministry spokesperson’s answer to KCNA. The general consensus converges towards interpreting that as an endorsement of Iran. That is not how I read that pronouncement. It was mostly criticizing the US and Israel. And in the last paragraph, the spokesperson said, “We respect the Iranian people’s right to vote and elect their leader.” If you take apart that sentence, the object of the verb support was not Iran or the new leader of Iran: it was the Iranian people’s right to elect their leader.
One could argue that by criticizing the US and Israel, isn’t that by default supporting Iran? At best, implicit support, maybe, but only in the first pronouncement from the Foreign Ministry. In the second pronouncement? Not really.
- So, on Iran: in this context, what effects might these events have on Kim Jong-un’s behaviour and decision-making? We know that during the Ninth Party Congress, he elevated his sister, Kim Yo-jong, and that the public presence of his daughter, Kim Ju-ae, has increased significantly. Could this lead to further shifts in the power structure, considering developments in Iran?
I think what’s happening in Iran isn’t going to fundamentally shift any strategic calculus on North Korea’s part, because Pyongyang has already been headed in a certain direction for a long time: continued development and production of nuclear weapons. The regime has even codified that into the constitution. What these series of events will probably do is reinforce in Kim Jong-un’s mind that North Korea has been on the right track all along. Despite the tightening of people’s belts for many years, in reference to poverty and hunger, the regime can frame itself as it did the right thing by not caving into the United States, not giving up their nuclear weapons. Thus, these events will basically just reinforce that mindset and that policy direction. But this doesn’t really change any strategic calculus on Kim Jong-un’s part.
Regarding the internal power structure, I do think it was interesting that the director of the Workers’ Party International Department, Kim Song Nam, now ranks higher on the Politburo compared to the Foreign Minister, Choe Son Hui. The reason that’s interesting to me is that it could spell a change in North Korea’s foreign policy priorities, or in terms of who is in control of North Korea’s foreign policy, because these are not just individuals going up and down, it’s also the institutions they represent.
Since the 1990s, nuclear negotiations with the United States, including the Agreed Framework, have been managed primarily by the Foreign Ministry. Before that, responsibility rested with the Party’s International Department. This division clearly reflects the broader structure of North Korea’s political system, in which the party defines strategic direction while state institutions implement policy. Foreign affairs have been a partial exception, as the Foreign Ministry took the lead in relations with Washington, including after the failure of the Hanoi Summit. Now it depends on which part of foreign policy we’re talking about. Party-to-party relations continue to reside, of course, with the party’s International Department. But with other elements of foreign policy, especially US-DPRK relations, it was really the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in charge. So, it remains to see how this will translate institutionally, and in terms of who owns North Korea’s foreign policy from now on.
One area to watch out for is the relationship with Russia and with China, because Choe Son Hui has been leading the relations with the Kremlin, and they have indeed blossomed under her initiative. This may not affect at all what she has been doing, but still worth keeping an eye on. Moreover, does Kim Song Nam’s promotion mean that North Korea is now going to pay more attention to improving relations with China and any country with which North Korea has party-to-party relations?
We’re talking about former and current communist and socialist parties in countries run by those parties, like Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam. Certainly, we have seen the Vietnamese president, the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party head, going to Pyongyang for the party founding anniversary celebrations. Definitely something to look out for.
- On the US–North Korea relationship in this context, is it realistic to expect – if not full normalisation – at least a more pragmatic approach to the nuclear issue?
If the US and North Korea were to sit down face to face… I mean, Kim Jong-un basically said it at the Ninth Party Congress, right? We’re not talking anymore about just not mentioning denuclearization as part of the agenda. We’re talking about the US essentially recognizing the North Koreans as a nuclear state. That’s really the condition. So, if we were to sit down face to face, then denuclearization will have to be off the table.
And again, this is where the hardening of conditions comes in. I don’t think the regime is going to be satisfied with just not mentioning denuclearization, they also want explicit recognition from the US. So, the question really is how far will the Trump administration go to accommodate those conditions. Kim Jong-un has laid his terms. A lot of people, when in DC, the number one question they’ll ask any North Korea expert is what the Trump administration’s policy on North Korea is. We have to look at this at two levels. There is President Trump’s North Korea policy, and there is a US government North Korea policy. The US government will continue to say, despite the fact that its latest national security document omitted the word “denuclearization,” that there has been no change in their stance, that denuclearization continues to be the ultimate goal. But President Trump hasn’t talked about denuclearization in connection with North Korea. He continues to say that he has a good relationship with Kim Jong-un and that he would like to meet him. So, the real answer is only one: the Trump administration’s policy on North Korea is unclear. I don’t know if anybody really knows. A lot of it depends on President Trump’s perception of the situation, of what he thinks he might do with Kim Jong-un. The right question to ask would be: is President Trump going to go so far as to recognize North Korea as a nuclear state?
That’s going to be tough, though, even for him. That’s my personal opinion. However, we have seen events unfold in ways we would not have expected. So never say never. With this president, and Kim Jong-un also knows that, if he’s going to get a deal with the US, his best shot is with Trump. But as I highlighted before, there’s no reason for North Korea to bend over backwards to accommodate the US. This is not 2018 and this is not 2019. A lot of things have changed, the situation has changed. Fundamentally, there’s really nothing Pyongyang can get from Washington, other than probably the biggest prize: recognition.
- Coming back to the question about the power structure, there was speculation during the Ninth Party Congress about the possible elevation of Kim Ju-ae within the party or state structure. That speculation ultimately did not materialize, presumably due to her young age. However, a recent analysis by Nikkei Asia, based on material from KCNA and Rodong Sinmun, depicted a figure who, despite holding no official title, appears to play a significant role in North Korea’s political landscape, given her recurring presence in both diplomatic and military contexts. Considering these findings, how do you see Kim Ju-ae’s future within the regime? Can she realistically be considered a genuine candidate to lead the country?
My honest answer is: I don’t know. The majority of analysts will tell you that she is the next leader. But I also remember back in June 2020, when Kim Jong-un’s sister was leading an anti-South Korea campaign, that a lot of experts were saying she’s next in line, that she could totally be the next leader of North Korea. Thus, we have to be very careful with these assessments. Because one thing we have to remember about the Kim Jong-un regime is that it is very, very savvy about propaganda.
And we have seen a lot of changes in the way they conduct it since Kim Jong-un came to power, like he publicly criticizing his officials, officially acknowledging problems, apologizing for problems. For example, look at the way they came out with COVID: they acknowledged an outbreak in Pyongyang in May 2022. I still think it was because they were forced to, because it had spread so much that they couldn’t really hide it any longer. But when you compare that to what happened in the 1990s, all the widespread hunger, the starvation, the famine, you didn’t see the regime acknowledging food shortages and deaths. If Kim Jong-un had been in power then, the propaganda would have been very different. My point here is that about the succession we don’t know, and nobody knows. Perhaps Kim Jong-un himself doesn’t even know whether the daughter is going to be the next leader.
He’s just turned 42 in January, still pretty young. His grandfather lived into his 80s. His father died when he was 69 or 70. So he’s still got maybe 20–30 years. This could be a succession campaign. What we’re seeing could be North Korea priming the public for a female leader. And knowing it’s going to take longer for the people to come to terms with a female leader, maybe they’re starting a succession campaign early. But it could also be that the daughter is being used as a propaganda tool. Or maybe it’s both.
I remember back in 2012 that it was pretty shocking to see the wife coming out to the public eye, her walking around with Kim Jong-un in a newly opened Pyongyang amusement park wearing a very short, tight dress, high heels, short haircut. All of that was shocking for the North Korean public, a woman with a short haircut, a woman whose dress didn’t reach her knees, high heels, very Western. And I think they were linking arms in public. That was designed to achieve a certain propaganda aim, a modern leader, like a normal human being with a wife. And I think she also symbolized North Korea’s receptiveness to foreign culture, because at the time Kim Jong-un was saying that if foreign elements serve the DPRK’s needs, than North Korea needs to adopt them.
Kim Jong-un’s sister certainly serves as a propaganda tool. Her statements are different from any other statements you see in the North Korean propaganda system. Each person serves a propaganda purpose. In that sense, the daughter symbolizes the next generation, the future generation. Certainly, when she came out for the first time in November 2022, her public appearances were mostly limited to military-related events. Her first appearance was in fact standing next to an ICBM. At the time, state media were emphasizing the importance of continued development of weapons of mass destruction for the safety of future generations. And that was a theme that resonated with a lot of people, because everyone has children, nephews, nieces, grandsons, granddaughters. I personally didn’t expect Kim Ju-ae to come to the party congress, because she’s still too young, only 13 or 14 years old. What is she going to do there? Is she going to be elected a party member?
At least one expert in South Korea was saying she could get the Workers’ Party First Secretary position. You can’t really let North Korea’s propaganda get to you… she serves a propaganda purpose and there have been some indicators of that. The way she’s portrayed in state media has evolved over time, she doesn’t look like a child anymore. When she first appeared, she looked like a little girl, dressed in a puffer jacket with her hair in a ponytail. But now she looks like a young woman. There was a time when she was gone for about 8 months, nearly a year, and when she came back, you could tell that she was carrying herself differently: it was very clear she had received some kind of training on how to behave in public. But is that enough to say that she’s being groomed as the successor?
I’m on the fence and I’m in the minority here, because most North Korea analysts will tell you that she’s definitely being groomed as a successor. Even South Korean intelligence, just before the Ninth Party Congress, came out and said she’s been designated the successor. There were a lot of rumours circulating about how she was going to make an appearance at the Ninth Party Congress.
